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1973).
TRUST IS BASIS FOR AWARD OF DAMAGES-State

Jersey Central Power and Light Company is the operator of an
atomic power plant located in Ocean County, New Jersey.' The plant
generates electricity by means of an atomic reactor,2 which uses water
from the nearby Forked River to absorb the generated heat. 3 The
heated water is subsequently discharged into Oyster Creek and Barnegat Bay, both of which are tidelands. 4 On January 28, 1972, the Oyster
Creek nuclear generating station experienced an unscheduled shutdown. 5 However, the pump used to dilute the hot water from the power
plant with cool water from Forked River continued to operate, thus
accelerating the temperature drop of the waters of Oyster Creek.6 The
7
resulting sudden drop in water temperature from 500 F. to 40' F.
caused approximately 500,000 fish, predominantly menhaden, to die
from thermal shock.8
1 State v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 125 N.J. Super. 97, 99, 308 A.2d 671, 672
(L. Div. 1973).
2 Although nuclear-powered electrical generators presently account for only four per
cent of the nation's electrical generating capacity, it has been projected that they will
account for approximately thirty per cent by 1985. See Bus. WEEK, Apr. 21, 1973, at 56.
For a discussion of thermal pollution from nuclear-powered electrical generating
stations see D. NELKIN, NUCLEAR POWER AND ITS CRITICS 1-19, 108-22 (1971). As to the problem of thermal pollution of fish-bearing waters see Cairns, Thermal Pollution-A Cause
for Concern, in ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT: SCIENCE AND POLITICS 179 (M. Gorden &
M. Gorden eds. 1972); Morris, The Problem of Thermal Pollution and Wurtz, Thermal
Pollution: The Effect of the Problem, in ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS 123, 131 (B. Wilson ed.
1968).
3 State v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 125 N.J. Super. 97, 99, 308 A.2d 671, 672
(L. Div. 1973).
4 Id.
5 Id. at 99-100, 308 A.2d at 672.
6 Id. at 100, 308 A.2d at 672. A power company representative, at a meeting between
the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) and the power company on March 3,
1973, described the shutdown as "'unscheduled' and resulting from 'human error."' Affidavit of Paul Hamer at 3, Plaintiff's Verified Complaint, State v. Jersey Cent. Power &
Light Co., 125 N.J. Super. 97, 308 A.2d 671 (L. Div. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Complaint].
7 State v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 125 N.J. Super. 97, 100, 308 A.2d 671, 672
(L. Div. 1973).
8 Id. On January 30, 1972, Paul Hamer, Principal Fisheries Biologist in the Division
of Fish, Game, and Shell Fisheries of the State Department of Environmental Protection,
was notified of the fish kill. Mr. Hamer indicated that the DEP maintains a water temperature monitoring station which is situated approximately one-half mile below the generating station discharge point. This monitoring station was the source of the data which
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In State v. Jersey Central Power & Light Co.,9 the Department of
Environmental Protection (DEP), on behalf of the state, filed a complaint consisting of three counts. 10 The first count was for the enforcement of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 23:5-28,11 which prohibits discharge of deleterious substances into New Jersey's tidal waters on penalty of $6,000
per day for each violation. 12 The second count was resolved on motion
at trial."3 The third count was at common law for recovery of damages
by the state as parens patriae for injury to wildlife such as the men14
haden fish.
Jersey Central moved to dismiss the third count on the ground
that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 1 The
defendant contended that the state could not collect "money damages
for destruction of fish in a wild state"'16 because it did not have "a proprietary right to the fish in its waters.' 7 Additionally, it was argued
that the state's proprietary interest in fish is "a qualified one limiting
it to the enactment and enforcement of fish and game laws and regulations and no more.""' However, Jersey Central did admit that the
was used to prove the occurrence of the temperature drop. On January 31, 1972, Mr.
Hamer observed approximately 500,000 dead fish, primarily menhaden, located threequarters of a mile below the power plant discharge point. Mr. Hamer also noted that
on March 2, 1973, there was a meeting between representatives of the power company and
the DEP "to discuss recurrent fish kills in Oyster Creek." Affidavit, Complaint, supra note
6, at 1-3.
9 125 N.J. Super. 97, 308 A.2d 671 (L. Div. 1973).
10 Id. at 98, 308 A.2d at 671.
11 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 23:5-28 (Supp. 1973-74) provides in pertinent part:
No person shall put or place into, turn into, drain into, or place where it can
run, flow, wash or be emptied into, or where it can find its way into any of the
fresh or tidal waters within the jurisdiction of this State any petroleum products,
debris, hazardous, deleterious, destructive or poisonous substances of any kind
.... In case of pollution of said waters by any substances injurious to fish, birds
or mammals, it shall not be necessary to show that the substances have actually
caused the death of any of these organisms. A person violating this section shall
be liable to a penalty of not more than $6,000 for each offense ....
12 125 N.J. Super. at 98, 308 A.2d at 671.
13 Id. at 98, 308 A.2d at 671-72. This count was for violation of N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 58:10-23.6 (Supp. 1973-74), which requires prompt notification of any illegal discharge.
Complaint, supra note 6, at 4.
14 125 N.J. Super. at 99, 308 A.2d at 672. The third count was a tort action which
would be governed by the rules concerning jury trials, discovery, etc., whereas the first
count was a summary action to recover a penalty imposed for violation of a statute. However, the parties agreed to waive these rules so that the counts could be tried together. Id.
15 Id.
16 Defendant's Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss the Third Count of the Complaint at 2, State v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 125 N.J. Super. 97, 308 A.2d 671 (L.
Div. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Defendant's Brief].
17 Defendant's Brief, supra note 16, at 1.
iId. at 3.
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state could maintain a claim for injunction under either the public
trust doctrine or statutes enacted for the conservation of wildlife.' 9
Decision on the motion for dismissal was reserved until a later date, at
which time a written opinion was rendered. 20
In denying the motion, the court held that the pumping of cold
water into the warm tidal waters by the defendant constituted a violation of the state statute prohibiting introduction of any deleterious
substance into the tidal or fresh waters of the state. 21 More significantly,
it found that the state had the right and the fiduciary duty to collect
damages for destruction of wildlife, which are part of the corpus of the
public trust. 22
The earliest known jurisprudential basis for the public trust doctrine discussed in the Jersey Central Power & Light decision is found
in Roman civil law. 2 As this law evolved, the waters of the rivers and

sea and the land thereunder were considered to be owned by the citizenry in common 24 and subject to the. prerogatives of the Roman people
19 See id. at 2-4.
125 N.J. Super. at 99, 308 A.2d at 672.
21 Id. at 100-01, 308 A.2d at 672-73. The court arrived at the determination that cold
water introduced into an environment of warm water was a deleterious substance under
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 23:5-28 (Supp. 1973-74) by looking to the legislative intent expressed at
the public hearing on Senate Bills Nos. 299 and 300 (1968), by Assemblyman Chester Apy
on behalf of Senator Alfred Beadleston, who introduced the bill. At the hearing Assemblyman Apy indicated that the basic purpose of the bill was
to tighten up the requirements and restrictions in an effort to seek to end and
evade the pollution of our waterways.
Now, this has been done, I think, essentially in two ways, if you look at the
bill. One, has been to emphasize and zero in, if you will, on the question not of
what causes the pollution but of the end results. The intent is not to try to
define, as the statutes presently do, that coal tar or sawdust or lime or anyone of
these things is going to cause the contamination. Rather, the object of the legislation is to say that anyone who permits any injurious substances which have
effects that are detrimental to the inhabitants of the waterways shall be responsible for doing it.
Now, the other part of the bills that I direct your attention to is that, at the
same time that this is done, there is taken out of existing legislation an exception
which provides that someone shall not be deemed responsible if he shows that
"every practical means has been used to prevent the pollution." Now this is being
taken out. This will have the effect of tightening up the legislation.
Hearing on N.J. Sen. Bills No. 299 6- 300 Before the Assembly Comm. on Air and Water
Pollution and Public Health, at 2-3 (Feb. 26, 1968). For a discussion of the use of hearings
to determine legislative intent see G. FoLsoM, LEGISLATE HISTORY 5 & n.7, 6 & n.12, 35 &
n.60, 36-37 (1972).
22 See 125 N.J. Super. at 103, 308 A.2d at 674.
23 See Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MIcH. L. Rav. 471, 475 (1970).
24 Note, State Citizen Rights Respecting GreatwaterResource Allocation: From Rome
to New Jersey, 25 RuTGERS L. Rv. 571, 576 (1971).
20
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for the important purposes of navigation and fishery. 25 The state was
considered to be the guardian of the common ownership of the public. 2
As the doctrine developed in Norman England, only the foreshore,
which consists of the waters subject to the ebb and flow of the tide and
the submerged land beneath, was considered to be subject to these
public rights. 27 However, the advent of. the dark ages and the accompanying decline in commerce and trade resulted in a weakening of
public rights in these areas.2s Title to the foreshore, which was considered alienable, was vested in the King. 29 It was not until restrictions
were placed upon the crown by the Magna Carta that a shift occurred
back to the favoring of public rights,3 0 with the King becoming trustee
of those rights for the people.8 '
With the transfer of the common law to the American colonies,
the sovereign rights formerly vested in the King as trustee eventually
devolved upon the states.32 Although subsequent case law development
has varied from state to state,33 perhaps the best description of the doctrine as it now exists was enunciated by the Supreme Court in its important decision of Illinois Central Railroadv. Illinois,3 4 where it stated
that the title to the navigable waters of Lake Michigan held by Illinois
was
a title held in trust for the people of the State that they may enjoy
the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over them, and
have liberty of fishing therein freed from the obstruction or interference of private parties.8

5

25 JUSTINIAN, INSTITUTES 2.1 (T. Cooper transl. 1812).
26

Sax, supra note 23, at 475; Note, supra note 24, at 576.

27 See Hale, De Jure Mavis in A CoLLEcrION OF TRACTS RELATIVE TO THE LAW OF
ENGLAND

10-12 (F. Hargrave ed. 1787).

28 Note, supra note 24, at 577; Note, The Public Trust in Tidal Areas: A Sometime

Submerged Traditional Doctrine, 79 YALE L.J. 762, 764 (1970).
29 See Hall, The Rights of the Crown, in A HISTORY OF THE FORasHORE 667, 671-72 (3d
ed. 1888).
30 Cohen, The Constitution, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Environment, 1970
UTAH L. REV. 388, 389; Note, The Public Trust in Tidal Areas: A Sometime Submerged
TraditionalDoctrine, 79 YALE L.J. 762, 768 (1970).
31 See J. ANGELL, A TREATISE ON THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY IN TrEa WATERS AND IN THE
SOIL AND SHoREs THEREOF 23-24 (1847); Fraser, Title to the Soil Under Public Waters

-The Trust Theory, 2 MINN. L. REV. 429, 434 (1918).
32 See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 18-26 (1894). The Shively opinion, which took
over a year to write, offers an excellent discussion of the development of the public trust
doctrine in both England and the United States.
83 Id. at 26.
34 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
85 Id. at 452. In Illinois Central, the Court upheld the repeal of a grant of submerged lands to the Railroad by the state of Illinois. The granf originally included all of
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Other cases have sanctioned the application of the trust doctrine
outside of the traditional areas of navigable waters and the submerged
lands underneath. One of the early decisions to so hold was Arnold v.
Mundy,3 6 an 1821 New Jersey case in which the court held that not
only the fish but also wild animals were among the common property
belonging to all of the citizens.8 7 Significantly, the court noted that
since only "transient usufructuary possession ' 31 could be had, actual
title could not be vested in the people. Therefore, the responsibility of
regulating and protecting the common property was placed upon the
39
state as sovereign.
Seventy-five years later, in Geer v. Connecticut,40 the Supreme
Court was faced with a case which concerned the validity of a Connecticut ordinance prohibiting the killing of certain fowl for purposes of
conveying the animals beyond the state lines. 41 In upholding the constitutionality of the ordinance, 42 the Court recognized that wild animals
were within a trust held for the people by the state. 43 Similarly, in
LaCoste v. Department of Conservation," the Court stated that wild
animals were "owned by the State in its sovereign capacity for the common benefit of all its people." 45 Therefore, the responsibility of regula46
tion and control was placed upon the state.
the submerged lands of Lake Michigan along the Chicago shoreline out to a distance
of one mile. Id. at 450. The Court held that a grant of all lands under the navigable waters would be "absolutely void on its face," for the reason that a state could not relieve
itself of the trust it held over these properties. Id. at 453.
The conveyance of property subject to these public rights has constituted one of the
major problems in this area. See generally Sax, supra note 23, at 491-548.
36 6 N.J.L. 1 (Sup. Ct. 1821).
37 Id. at 71.
38 "Usufructuary" possession is that exercised by "[o]ne who has the usufruct or
right of enjoying anything in which he has no property." BLACK's LAw DICrIONARY 1713
(4th ed. 1951).
39 6 N.J.L. at 71.
40 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
41 Id.
42 Id. at 535.
43 Id. at 529. The Court stated:
[T]he development of free institutions has led to the recognition of the fact that
the power or control lodged in the State, resulting from this common ownership, is
to be exercised, like all other powers of government, as a trust for the benefit of
the people, and not as a prerogative for the advantage of the government, as distinct from the people, or for the benefit of private individuals as distinguished
from the public good.
Id.
44 263 U.S. 545 (1924).
45 Id. at 549.
46 Id.
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The majority opinion in Toomer v. Witsel147 offered a confusing
picture of the "sovereign ownership" theory. Toomer involved a challenge by citizens of Georgia to certain South Carolina statutes which
regulated shrimp fishing in the three-mile zone off of its coast. 48 The
Court disagreed with Georgia's argument that its "ownership" of the
shrimp provided an exception to the privileges and immunities clause,
thereby entitling it to discriminate against citizens of another state.4 9
The Court did not totally reject this theory, however, but rather felt
that such a policy was permissible so long as consistent with certain
constitutional restrictions. 50 Justice Frankfurter, in his concurring opinion, offered clarification for the majority's conclusion. In an often
quoted passage, he stated:
A State may care for its own in utilizing the bounties of nature
within her borders because it has technical ownership of such
bounties or, when ownership is in no one, because the State may
for the common good exercise all the authority that technical ownership ordinarily confers. 51
The court in Jersey CentralPower & Light, after examining much
of this prior case law, recognized that the fish were clearly within the
corpus of the public trust, thereby giving rise to a remedy when injury
is shown. However, the opposing parties in the action were not in
agreement as to the nature of the remedy to be afforded. While Jersey
Central did recognize the right of the state to injunctive or equitable
relief in such a situation, 2 it challenged the state's right to collect damages on the ground that it had "an alleged lack of proprietary interest"
47 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
48 Id. at 387-91.
49 Id. at 399-403. The Court, citing R. POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY
OF LAW 197-202 (1954), distinguished between the Roman concepts of dominium and imperium. Dominium was defined as ownership, whereas imperium was deemed to be the
power of the government to regulate. Originally, under Roman law, the power of the
state over wild fish and game was imperium. 334 U.S. at 402 n.37.
50 334 U.S. at 402. Justice Vinson, speaking for the Court, stated:
The whole ownership theory, in fact, is now generally regarded as but a fiction
expressive in legal shorthand of the importance to its people that a State have
power to preserve and regulate the exploitation of an important resource. And
there is no necessary conflict between that vital policy consideration and the
constitutional command that the State exercise that power, like its other powers,
so as not to discriminate without reason against citizens of other States.
Id. (footnote omitted).
51 Id. at 408 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
52 125 N.J. Super. at 102, 308 A.2d at 673. The court stated:
Both sides recognize the right of the State, as parens patriae (which is to say,
trustee), to injunctive relief in order to conserve the trust corpus from actions
of a wrongdoer.
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fish. 53

in the
Two cases decided in other jurisdictions were offered by
54
Jersey Central as support for its contention.
In Commonwealth v. Agway, Inc.,55 the state of Pennsylvania
brought an action in trespass against the defendant asking monetary
damages for the value of certain fish killed by pollutants which had
been dumped into a creek.5 The court affirmed a lower court's decision
dismissing the complaint on the ground that the state did not have a
sufficient "proprietary interest" in fish still in the wild state to support
a claim for damages. 57 In doing so, the court also noted that the interest
of the state was a "sovereign" one, which interest the court interpreted
as being limited only to the authority to regulate. 58
Similarly, in State v. Dickinson Cheese Co.,59 the State Game and
Fish Department of North Dakota brought an action claiming damages
for the death of some 36,000 pounds of fish which had been killed as
the result of whey being discharged into a river by the defendant. 60
Citing Agway, the court held that the state had only a sovereign interest in the wild fish, which was insufficient to support a civil claim for
damages.6 '
The court in Jersey Central Power & Light, however, rejected the
proprietary interest requirement as being unnecessarily restrictive of
the concept of the public trust. Although recognizing that the state
possessed only a sovereign interest in thefish, 62 the court, by appearing
to equate the state's role as trustee with its role under the separate concept of the state as parens patriae,6 3 found that a sovereign interest
alone was sufficient to support a claim for damages:
Defendant's Brief, supra note 16, at 1; see 125 N.J. Super. at 102, 308 A.2d at 679.
Defendant's Brief, supra note 16, at 4-5.
55 210 Pa. Super. 150, 232 A.2d 69 (1967).
56 Id. at 151, 232 A.2d 69-70.
57 Id. at 155, 232 A.2d at 71.
58 Id. The court noted:
The Commonwealth has the power for the common good to determine when, by
whom and under what conditions fish running wild may be captured and thus
owned and the power to control the resale and transportation of such fish thereby
qualifying the ownership of the captor. It has this power as a result of its sovereignty over the land and the people.
53

54

Id.
59 200 N.W.2d 59 (N.D. 1972).
60 Id. at 60.
61 Id. at 61.
62 125 N.J. Super. at 102, 308 A.2d at 673. This recognition can be derived from the
statement by the court that fish were included in the public trust "as far as they are capable
of ownership." Id.
63 The state demanded that the court order "the defendant to make whole the State
of New Jersey, as trustee for the public, for damages to the aforementioned public re-

1974]

NO TES

[I]t would appear to this court unreasonable and injudicious to
impose the fiduciary duties of a trustee upon the State while withholding the ability to have the corpus reimbursed for a dimuni64
tion [sic] attributable to a wrongdoer.

Although the concepts of the public trust and parens patriae were
used interchangeably in Jersey Central Power & Light, parens patriae
developed independently of the public trust. Parenspatriae in England
referred to the King; in the United States it refers to the state as
sovereign. 65 For the most part, the doctrine has been viewed as applying to the state's right to protect those who are incapable of caring for
themselves. 66 However, in the United States within the last century the
concept has developed to include those situations in which the state
seeks compensation for damages to its "quasi-sovereign 67 interests
which are separate and apart from those injuries suffered individually
by its citizens. 6
The requirement that such an interest be independent of that of
its citizens has its basis in the constitutional philosophy of standing
to sue. The eleventh amendment has been construed to prohibit a suit
by one state against another on behalf of its citizens who have a legally
cognizable injury.6 9 Although the eleventh amendment does not forbid
sources." Complaint, supra note 6, at 5. However, in its brief in opposition to defendant's
motion to dismiss, it was stated: "The State in the Third Count of the Complaint is
seeking recovery as parens patriae, or 'parent of the country.'" Memorandum of Law on
Behalf of the State of New Jersey at 7, State v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 125 N.J.
Super. 97, 308 A.2d 671 (L. Div. 1973). This claim for relief under the parens patriae doctrine in the Brief immediately followed three pages stating the claim of the state for
damages in its capacity as trustee. Thus, the court, in its statement of the third count
of the complaint, appeared to follow the state's lead in equating the two. The court noted
that the state "seeks to recover an award at common law, as parens patriae, for damages
done to wild life, e.g., menhaden fish." 125 N.J. Super. at 99, 808 A.2d at 672.
64 125 N.J. Super. at 102, 308 A.2d at 673-74.
65 BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1269 (4th ed. 1951). See, e.g., In re Turner, 94 Kan. 115,
120-21, 145 P. 871, 872-73 (1915); McIntosh v. Dill, 86 Okla. 1, 9, 205 P. 917, 925 (1922).
66 Beverley's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 1118 (K.B. 1603). English law gave guardianship of
both idiots and lunatics to the King. While the King was responsible for the property of
both idiots and lunatics, he did not have custodial responsibility for the person of the
lunatic, whose condition was considered temporary. However, he did have such responsibility for the person of the idiot, whose condition was permanent. Id. at 1126.
67 Suits to protect the general welfare of the public are recognized as a valid function
of a sovereign nation. Thus, it seems logical that an individual state as "quasi-sovereign"
should also be able to assert such rights. Malina & Blechman, Parens Patriae Suits for
Treble Damages Under the Antitrust Laws, 65 Nw. U.L. R.v. 193, 203 (1970).
68 See notes 73-82 infra and accompanying text.
69 Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 446 (1945) (dictum); Massachusetts v.
Missouri, 308 U.S. 1,17 (1939); Oklahoma ex rel. Johnson v. Cook, 304 U.S. 387, 394 (1938);
Oklahoma v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 220 U.S. 277, 288-89 (1911); New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76, 91 (1883).
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such suits where there is a private party as a defendant, it would appear
that this type of suit would also be barred because of the right to
individual remedies such as class action suits.7 0 The presence of these
obstacles thus necessitates an independent interest on the part of the
state. This interest has been argued to exist in either of two situations:
(1) where the state itself clearly incurs an injury, such as the resulting
effects of damage to the economy, 71 or (2) where the general public
suffers an injury so that no one individual has legal standing to sue.7 2
This modern interpretation of parens patriae, affording a state
relief for injury to a quasi-sovereign interest, was recognized by the
Supreme Court in the case of Missouri v. IllinoisJ5 Missouri involved
a suit to enjoin a discharge of sewage by the defendants. 74 The Court
observed "[t]hat suits brought by individuals, each for personal injuries, threatened or received, would be wholly inadequate and disproportionate remedies."75 Additionally, the Court reasoned that since
such sewage discharge could result in a "substantial impairment of
the health and prosperity" of the affected towns, injury could result
70 See Note, The Original Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court, 11 STAN.
L. REV. 665, 677-78 (1959).
71 Slee Comment, State Protection of its Economy and Environment: Parens Patriae
Suits for Damages, 6 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 411, 413-17 (1970).
72 Id. at 417-18. Injury to the general public is also the basic prerequisite to bringing
a suit under the common law theory of public nuisance. See W. PROssER, LAW OF TORTS § 88
(4th ed. 1971). Except where a statute confers standing on an individual to bring an
action against a public nuisance, the state is the only party that may prosecute an offender.
Thus, while at first glance public nuisance actions would appear to be an effective deterrent against polluters, in actuality very few of these actions have been brought due to the
efforts of industrial lobbies coupled with political pressures and a lack of initiative by
government agencies. See Comment, The Environmental Lawsuit: Traditional Doctrines
and Evolving Theories to Control Pollution, 16 WAYNE L. REv. 1085, 1108-09 (1970). Also,
the requirements of proof and the defenses which can be raised in a nuisance action
present additional difficulties. W. PRossm, supra, §§ 88, 91.
Case law also provides that an individual can recover damages for a public nuisance
if he or she can show particular damage not suffered by the general public. Id. § 88, at
586-91. Success by an individual may raise the spectre of double recovery where a state
is also bringing an action. See note 114 infra.
73 180 U.S. 208, 241 (1901). In two prior decisions, the Supreme Court had occasion to
consider the future possibility of suits by the state as parens patriae for injury to quasisovereign interests. Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1 (1900), indicated that Louisiana's quasisovereign interests gave her standing to sue to prevent injury to her citizenry from an embargo on commerce established by Texas. Id. at 22. The Court cited In re Debs, 158 US.
564 (1895), a case in which it was held that the federal government had the right to protect the general public from injury from a railroad strike by bringing suit for injunction.
Id. at 586.
74 180 U.S. at 242-43.
75 Id. at 241.
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to the entire state and, therefore, the state was the proper party to

76
bring SUit.

In Kansas v. Colorado,77 the Court recognized the concept of injury to the economy in a parens patriae suit. This was a case in which
Kansas sought to enjoin Colorado from diverting the water of the
Arkansas River for irrigation and mining purposes. 78 The Court held
that Kansas had an interest "[b]eyond its property rights" since the
economic welfare of the land bordering the Arkansas River affected the
state's general welfare. 79 In another case decided that same day, the
Court, in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 80 again firmly maintained
that to recover under the parens patriae doctrine a state must show injury to its own interests apart from that suffered by its inhabitants:
This is a suit by a State for an injury to it in its capacity of quasisovereign. In that capacity the State has an interest independent
of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air
within its domain. 81
82
Subsequent cases have reaffirmed this criterion.
While all of the earlier parens patriae cases were brought in
equity to obtain injunctions for the purpose of protecting the quasisovereign interests of the state, 83 the concept of a parens patriae suit
by a state to recover damages has only recently been recognized. In the
1945 case of Georgia v. Pennsylvania Railroad, 4 a parens patriae suit
was brought by the plaintiffs in both equity and law-in equity to restrain the defendants from setting railroad freight rates so as to dis85
criminate against Georgia locations in violation of the Sherman Act,
76 Id.
77

206 U.S. 46 (1907).

at'47-48.
Id. at 99.
80 206 U.S. 230 (1907). This case involved a suit by Georgia to restrain Tennessee
78 Id.
79

copper companies from discharging noxious gas into the air. Id. at 236.
81 Id. at 237 (emphasis in original).
82 Oklahoma ex rel. Johnson v. Cook, 304 U.S. 387, 393 (1938) (denying leave to file
for original jurisdiction where state was bringing action on behalf of particular individuals); Wyoming v. Colorado, 286 U.S. 494, 508-09 (1932) (overruling motion to dismiss suit
which sought to enforce decree determining water rights between states); Pennsylvania v.
West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 592 (1923) (enjoining state from enforcing statute curtailing
sales to other states of natural gas produced within its borders); Maine v. M/V Tamano,
357 F. Supp. 1097, 1100 (D. Me. 1973) (denial of motion to dismiss count asking damage
award under parens patriae doctrine); Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 301 F. Supp. 982, 986 (D.
Hawaii 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 431 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1970), afl'd, 405 U.S. 251 (1972)
(suit by state for damages to its general economy).
83 See cases collected at notes 73-81 supra and accompanying text.
84 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
85

See id. at 443.
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and at law for the resulting damages to the state's economy. 86 While
allowing the state to continue its claim for injunctive relief, 7 the Supreme Court decided that since the rates under attack had been approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission, any award of damages would serve as an improper rebate, and thus in effect give an un8
fair advantage to the defendant companies over their competitors.1
However, since the Court did not rule on the propriety of an award of
damages under a parens patriae claim in other circumstances, the door
was left open for future decisions.
The next case to deal with a parens patriaeclaim for damages was
a 1969 Hawaii federal district court case, Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co.8 9
Although subsequently reversed on other grounds by the Ninth Circuit, whose decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court,90 the case is
significant for its discussion of the prerequisites for recovery under
parens patriae.
In Standard Oil, the state of Hawaii brought an antitrust action
against certain oil companies, alleging violations of sections 1 and 2
of the Sherman Act. 91 In addition to requesting damages for injuries
to its proprietary interests, Hawaii sought relief as parens patriae for
harm to the " 'general welfare of the State and its citizens.' ",92 The
86
87
88
89

See id. at 444.

92

Id. (quoting from amended complaint). Among the injuries allegedly sustained

Id. at 462.
Id. at 453.

301 F. Supp. 982 (D. Hawaii 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 431 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir.
1970), aff'd, 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
90 Both of the higher courts based their reversals on the ground that injury to the
state's general economy was not an injury to business or property within section 4 of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970). At trial, Standard Oil had contended, inter alia, that
damage to the economy was not "business or property" as provided in section 4. In rejecting this contention, the district court relied on Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City
of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906), which held that a public entity forced to pay higher prices
did suffer an injury to its property. 301 F. Supp. at 988.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit, assuming arguendo that the economy could suffer
injuries as alleged, held on two related grounds that Hawaii's claim for damages did not
fall within section 4 of the Act. First, the term "business or property" is to be construed
in its ordinary sense, thus obviously excluding injury to the economy. Second, the court
stated that injury to the economy was not a sufficiently direct interest to warrant recovery.
Consequently, the court reversed the decision below and granted the motion to dismiss.
Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 431 F.2d 1282, 1285-86 (9th Cir. 1970).
The Supreme Court affirmed on essentially the same grounds. It examined the legislative history of 15 U.S.C. § 15a, which provides for the recovery of damages by the United
States for injury to its "business or property." Finding the intent of Congress in enacting
this section to be to allow recovery only for injury to proprietary interests, the Court
analogized to section 4 and denied recovery. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251,
264-65 (1972).
91 301 F. Supp. at 983.
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court, relying upon language found in the PennsylvaniaRailroad case,
held that a parens patriaeaction for damages was permissible and thus
denied the defendants' motion to dismiss.9 3
To avoid the greater possibility of double recovery that might arise
in a claim for damages, 94 the court reemphasized the criterion that in
order for a state to recover under parens patriae, it must have an interest separate and apart from that of its individual citizens.9 5 The Standard Oil decision also espoused an additional condition which required
that a "substantial number" of citizens must be affected before a state
may recover as parens patriae.9 6 This requirement apparently was to
avoid any possibility that the state was bringing an action on behalf of
individual citizens. 7 While the court relied on the specific language of
earlier parens patriaecases for support,98 the necessity of such a requirement must be questioned. The extent and nature of the harm suffered
should be the determining factor, rather than the number of citizens affected.99
The first decision to clearly permit an award of damages under the
parens patriae doctrine for injury to the environment was Maine v.
M/ V Tamano,00 a federal decision from the District of Maine which
involved a spill of 100,000 gallons of oil into the Casco Bay.' 0 ' The state
sued for damages for injury to its coastal waters and marine life, as
well as for clean-up costs and property damage. 10 2 As in Standard Oil,
the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the count that asked for damwere (1) wrongful extraction of revenues from the state, (2) increased taxes to offset loss of
revenue, (3) wrongful restrictions of certain commercial opportunities, (4) hindrance of the
full utilization of natural wealth, (5) reduction in competitive value of goods produced in
Hawaii, (6) frustration of remedial efforts by the state, and (7) arresting of development by
the Hawaiian economy. Id. at 983-84.
93 Id. at 988.
94 In the usual case with equitable remedies, the possibility of double recovery will not
arise because of the very nature of the remedy. One party with standing is sufficient to
obtain all the relief that is possible. However, the chance of double recovery could be
great when actions for damages are filed by several parties. See Justice Marshall's majority
opinion in the Supreme Court decision, 405 U.S. at 261-62.
95 301 F. Supp. at 988.
96 Id. at 986.
97 Comment, Wrongs Without Remedy: The Concept of Patens Patriae Suits for
Treble Damages Under the Antitrust Laws, 43 S. CAL. L. REv. 570, 586 (1970); Note, supra
note 70, at 676.
98 301 F. Supp. at 986-87. The cases relied on were Kansas v. Colorado, 206 US. 46, 99
(1907), and Land O'Lakes Creameries, Inc. v. Louisiana State Bd. of Health, 160 F. Supp.
387, 389 (E.D. La. 1958).
99 Comment, supra note 71, at 418; Note, supra note 70, at 677.
100 357 F. Supp. 1097 (D. Me. 1973).
101 Id. at 1098.
102 Id. at 1098-99.
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ages under the parens patria, doctrine. 0 3 In denying the motion, the
court stated:
If Maine can establish damage to her quasi-sovereign interests
in her coastal waters and marine life, independent of whatever
individual damages may have been sustained by her citizens, there
is no apparent reason why the present action to recover such
damage cannot be maintained. In the view of this Court, the
complaint stateg a viable parens patriae cause of action .... 104
Thus, Tamano adhered to the first requirement of Standard Oil and
preceding cases. However, although it recognized that a substantial
number of citizens had been affected, the court questioned the necessity
for this prerequisite. 0 5
While Tamano was expressly identified by the district court as a
parens patriae action, the underlying rationale behind the decision in
Maryland v. Amerada Hess Corp.10 6 is not as easily discernible. Amerada Hess was identified as a parens patriae decision in the Tamano
opinion.10 7 However, Amerada Hess itself makes no express mention of
the concept. Rather, the court's language is couched, as in Jersey Central Power & Light, in terms of the state having a sufficient proprietary
interest as trustee for its citizens to maintain a suit for damages. 10 8
The action arose when the state of Maryland brought suit to recover for damages sustained as a result of an oil spill into Baltimore
Harbor. 0 9 The defendants contended, inter alia, in their motion to
dismiss that the state, as trustee of the waters, did not have a proprietary interest which would sustain a claim for damages. 110 The court rejected this argument by noting that
if the State is deemed to be the trustee of the waters, then, as
trustee, the State must be empowered to bring suit to protect the
corpus of the trust-i.e., the waters-for the beneficiaries of the
trust-i.e., the public."'
103 Id. at 1099.
104

Id. at 1102.

105 Id. at 1101.

108 350 F. Supp. 1060 (D. Md. 1972).
107 See 357 F. Supp. at 1102.
108 350 F. Supp. at 1066-67.
109 Id. at 1062.
110 Id. at 1066.
111 Id. at 1067. This language was quoted by the court in Jersey Cent. Power & Light
in arriving at its decision. 125 N.J. Super. at 103, 308 A.2d at 674.
In reaching its decision, the court in Amerada Hess relied heavily on language from
Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896), and Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948). 350
F. Supp. at 1066-67. For a discussion of these two cases, see notes 40-43 and 47-51 supra and
accompanying text.
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In arriving at its decision, the court in Jersey Central Power &
Light appeared to utilize both the parenspatriaeconcept and the alternative approach taken in the Amerada Hess decision. However, an
examination of parens patriae has shown that the court could have
relied solely on this doctrine as a vehicle for recovery. The requirement of a separate state interest should be satisfied in this particular
instance because the harm was to the general welfare and thus no individual had standing to sue. 1 2 The earlier parens patriae cases afforded
equitable relief essentially for this reason." 3 Consequently, relief in
such situations should be extended to include damages since any fear
of any double recovery will be alleviated by the lack of standing on the
4
part of any one particular litigant."
It was this type of parens patriae recovery which actually occurred
in both Jersey Central Power & Light and Amerada Hess. Thus, if injury to the public at large is accepted as an adequate "separate state
interest," then recovery of damages under both the parens patriae and
public trust doctrines can be equated. However, the use of parens
patriae will avoid the proprietary interest argument adopted by the
defendants in both cases. Perhaps this was the underlying rationale of
the Jersey Central Power & Light court in interjecting the parens
patriae concept into what originally was an action brought under the
public trust." 5
Regardless of which doctrine is given primary emphasis, the measurement of the damages to be awarded presents certain problems. Placing a dollar value upon injury to the environment is concededly difficult."0 Moreover, earlier cases provide little support. Both Tamano and
Amerada Hess involved a motion to dismiss on the merits; denial of the
7
motion left the issue of monetary damages to be resolved at trial."
112 See note 72 supra and accompanying text.
113 Comment, supra note 71, at 418 n.44. See notes 73-81 supra and accompanying text.
114 As noted previously, an individual, if he can prove "particular damage," can collect
damages even though the harm incurred is considered to be a public nuisance. See note 72
supra. This may present a possibility of double recovery where a state is simultaneously
bringing an action under the public trust and parens patriaedoctrines. One solution which
has been offered to this problem is to deduct the damages recovered by the private litigants
from the award recovered by the state. Maine v. M/V Tamano, 357 F. Supp. 1097, 1102 (D.
Me. 1973).
Recently, some states have enacted statutes giving individual citizens standing to maintain suits in their courts to remedy harm to the "public trust" and other natural resources.
See, e.g., MimH. Coisp. LAws ANN. § 691.1201 et seq. (Supp. 1973-74). However, as these
statutes provide only for equitable relief, there can be no possibility of duplicating recovery.
115 See note 63 supra.
116 Comment, supra note 71, at 421.
117 Tamano, 357 F. Supp. at 1102; Amerada Hess, 350 F. Supp. at 1071.
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The court in Jersey Central Power & Light recognized the difficulty in assessing damages when it stated that because "the environment may well have been adversely affected in many ways . . . the

118
court cannot speculate as to the monetary value of these damages."
Instead, an award of $935 was made, based on the market value of the
menhaden killed. 119 While market value may be adequate in measuring
the loss of fish or wildlife, it is an insufficient standard to award damages for harm to the quality of the waters or the environment. Thus,
the decision has left unresolved important questions concerning proof
of damages-a necessary prerequisite to recovery.
However, the decision in Jersey Central Power & Light must still
be considered an example of the law evolving to meet the exigencies
of the time. As the court noted, it would be "unreasonable and injudicious" not to allow an award of damages to the state for violation of
the corpus of the public trust.120 This is particularly so in an era in
which the quality of our environment is considered to be a critical
issue. Although the court utilized the concept of parens patriae in addition to the public trust doctrine, if injury to the general welfare of
the public is considered to be a separate state interest, then these concepts may be considered interchangeable. Additionally, it can be argued
that such an approach will expand the present narrow scope of the
12
public trust doctrine to include other areas of the environment. '
Thus, the Jersey Central Power & Light decision, while overlooking some of the distinctions between the parens patriae and the public
trust doctrines, appears to be judicially sound. The problem of ascertaining damages, however, is one major question that was left unanswered. Barring any significant problems as to this issue in future cases,
the Jersey Central Power & Light decision may well serve as precedent
for another legal remedy in the protection of the environment.

Wayne L. Christian
118 125 N.J. Super. at 103, 308 A.2d at 674.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 102, 308 A.2d at 673-74. One author has suggested that any monies collected
by the state be put in the state treasury to be applied toward tax reductions. Comment.
supra note 97, at 593 n.138.
121 Several authors have advocated that the courts should expand the trust doctrine to
include the right to a clean environment. See I V. YANNACONE, B. CotEN & S. DAVISON,
ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS & REMEIES § 2:1 (1972); Sax, supra note 23, at 556-57; Cohen,
supra note 30, at 393-94; Comment, supra note 72, at 1126-27.

